The faulty assumptions behind the OneGov Strategy

The General Services Administration continues to advance the OneGov Strategy as a means for the federal government to engage with private-sector technology companies to meet public sector needs. The core premise of OneGov is this:

In the commercial marketplace, the U.S. government functions as Fortune One; the largest of all enterprise buyers. Industry, therefore, should offer pricing that reflects the government’s collective buying power, especially for common goods and commodity IT. By aggregating demand and consolidating purchasing power, the OneGov Strategy promises to deliver the lowest prices and best value for taxpayers. GSA aims to secure agreements with companies providing ubiquitous products, with those negotiated terms accessible through the GSA Schedules program.

This approach is an extension of previous initiatives like the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) and Category Management. It reflects a familiar private-sector practice, used by firms like Caterpillar and Capital One, for consolidating purchases to reduce costs. Although newly branded, the strategy is far from new. Centralization efforts began in the early 2000s under President George W. Bush’s Management Agenda, which also launched the FSSI in 2005. The Obama administration followed by introducing Category Management. OneGov builds upon these earlier efforts.

But if this idea is so sound, why has the government failed to realize its intended benefits after two decades?

The answer may lie in the flawed assumptions that underpin the strategy.

Assumption 1: The Federal Government Is a Single Enterprise

The U.S. government is not a unified enterprise. It is not managed, funded, or structured as one. Rather, it operates as a federated system.

Instead of likening government operations to a corporation like Citigroup or Toyota, a better comparison would be Berkshire Hathaway, which owns a diverse portfolio of companies, from Dairy Queen to GEICO to BNSF Railways, that operate independently due to their distinct missions. Likewise, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NASA, and the USDA all have vastly different missions, needs, procurement processes, and regulatory environments. They don’t procure goods and services the same way, under the same conditions, or for the same purposes.

This reality undermines the premise that a single vehicle approach, particularly in federal IT, can achieve broad adoption or success.

Assumption 2: IT Can Be Treated as a Commodity

The rapid evolution of the IT sector fundamentally conflicts with the notion of IT as a commodity.

Commodities, like pencils or paperclips, do not drive strategic value. They do not enable experimentation, innovation, or process improvement. Treating IT as a commodity ignores its role in enabling performance, generating actionable knowledge, and supporting mission-critical services.

The commoditization of IT is not just misguided, it is counterproductive.

Assumption 3: Agencies “Go Shopping” for IT

How do successful companies acquire IT? Do they send employees to Best Buy or browse Office Depot flyers? Do they wait for Amazon Flash Fridays?

Of course not.

Private-sector IT acquisitions are strategically aligned with architecture, security, and long-term performance goals. Companies partner with vendors to ensure compatibility and efficiency across their ecosystems.

The OneGov Strategy, and its predecessors, operate under a “buyer-as-shopper” mentality. This model treats agencies as consumers chasing deals, rather than mission-driven organizations managing complex, secure IT environments. It reduces federal acquisition to a glorified Friday flash sale.

Assumption 4: GSA Is Making Direct Agreements with OEMs

GSA has promoted its intention to “disrupt” traditional procurement by pursuing direct agreements with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). But these direct deals are hard to verify, if they exist at all.

Where, for example, is Google's GSA Schedule for G-Suite? Microsoft’s? Adobe’s? Salesforce’s? They are nowhere to be found because they don’t exist.

GSA’s claim that it cannot engage OEMs directly due to “privity of contract” falls flat. These companies routinely engage federal agencies on sensitive security matters, just ask DOD or CISA.

In reality, OEMs continue to manage their federal engagements through value-added resellers (VARs) and supply chain partners. GSA’s narrative around direct deals is less an assumption and more a fiction, one not reflected in practice.

Assumption 5: It Delivers Taxpayer Value

The claim that OneGov delivers taxpayer value sounds logical, cut out the middleman, pass the savings along. But here’s the issue: GSA lacks the data to support that assertion.

Only two weeks ago GSA mandated participation in its Transactional Data Reporting (TDR) initiative after a decade-long pilot. Until now, it had no reliable mechanism to capture transaction-level pricing data across its Schedules program.

So where does GSA get the data to make its value claims? From other acquisition vehicles, from other agencies, or from industry partners. GSA is infamous for its frequent data calls; a practice rooted in the fact that it simply doesn’t know what’s happening within its own acquisition vehicles.

Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) doesn’t offer the needed detail and often lags by three to six months. It’s like trying to identify a car’s make and model based on its exhaust. As a result, any assertion of taxpayer savings is purely speculative.

What’s more, as GSA pushes for more “direct” relationships, it’s unclear whether pricing will go down or up. Removing intermediaries may reduce markup, but it also shifts responsibility (and cost) to companies that now must directly service government clients. Many OEMs prefer to let VARs handle the burden of support, integration, and compliance—so they can focus on what they do best: making secure, innovative technology.

Conclusion

The branding may be new, but the effort is not. For two decades, the federal government has struggled to centralize sourcing because these initiatives rest on misplaced assumptions.

If a strategy fails to account for the government’s federated structure, ignores the realities of IT supply chains, and misrepresents how organizations procure technology, then it is unlikely to succeed.

GSA may continue its marketing push to shape a world where its strategy fits but unless its approach reflects the actual structure and behavior of government and industry, it may simply be repeating the definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over, while expecting different results.

Jon Johnson is a trusted advisor on government-wide procurement initiatives, with experience spanning GSA, NASA, USDA, and the federal supply chain risk management community. He provides strategic guidance to technology companies and their value-added resellers, helping them navigate the intersection of federal acquisition, policy, and mission needs.